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CASE COMMENT
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ELEVENTH COMMANDMENT TO RELIGIOUS
GROUPS: THOU SHALT NOT BE LIABLE FOR THINE
INTENTIONAL INTANGIBLE TORTS
Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc.,
819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987)
In Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. 1 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the first amendment provides a privilege
against tort liability to religious groups if tort liability would curtail the
free exercise of their religious beliefs.2
The plaintiff, Janice Paul, had been a member of the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses since 1967. 3 In 1975, she decided to disassociate herself from the
Church.4 In 1981, the Governing Body of Jehovah's Witnesses, acting
through defendants,5 issued a new interpretation of canon law, directing
present members to shun disassociated persons. 6 In 1984, Paul went to a
1. 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987).
2. The scope of this Case Comment is limited to the question of whether the Ninth Circuit's
extension of past Supreme Court free exercise precedents to intentional torts committed by the
church is consistent with the first amendment and these precedents. The issue of whether religious
institutions are immune from tort liability based on the "charitable immunity" doctrine is beyond
the scope of this Comment. For a general discussion on the effect of "charitable immunity" on
religious groups' tort liability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E comments b, c
(1977); PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OR TORTS § 133 (5th ed. 1984)[hereinafter PROSSER]; Note,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors. Can Outrageous Conduct be
"Free Exercise"?, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1295, 1302-07 n.19 (May 1986).
3. 819 F.2d at 876.
4. Id. Paul left the Church because of her parents' disfellowship (expulsion from the Church)
in 1975, which resulted from internal discord in the congregation. Id. Elders of the Lower Valley
congregation urged Paul not to discuss, with other members of the Church, her belief that her par-
ents had received unjust treatment. Failure to heed this advice, they warned, would result in her
own disfellowship. Id.
5. Defendants, two Tract Societies, are the corporate arm of the Jehovah's Witnesses' Gov-
erning Body. Id. at 876-77.
6. Id. at 877. Prior to 1981, the Church distinguished between ex-members who disassociated
themselves and those who were disfellowshipped. Those who fell into the former category, including
Paul, were subject to no express sanction. In fact, because of the close nature of many Jehovah's
Witness communities, disassociated persons were still consulted in secular matters. Id.
Disfellowshipped members, on the other hand, were "shunned" by all the members of the Church.
For a definition of "shunning", see infra note 8.
In 1981, the Governing Body eliminated the distinction between disfellowshipped and disassoci-
ated members. Thereafter, disassociated members were to be treated as if they were disfellowship-
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Jehovah's community to visit friends and family.7 When she tried to
speak to her friends, however, they "shunned"' her because of the Gov-
erning Body's new interpretation of Church law.9
Paul brought suit in Washington State Supreme Court against the
Governing Body of Jehovah's Witnesses, alleging the intangible torts of
defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud, and outrageous conduct.10 De-
fendants removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds." The
district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.1 2 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed, but on different grounds
than the district court. 3 The Ninth Circuit held that because shunning
is part of the Jehovah's Witnesses religious beliefs, the first amendment
free exercise clause"4 protects the Church from tort liability for intangi-
ble torts.1 5
In interpreting the free exercise clause, the Supreme Court has recog-
ped. See Disfellowshipping-How to View It, THE WATCHTOWER (Sept. 15, 1981) (citing various
passages from the Bible to justify the decision).
7. 819 F.2d at 877.
8. "Shunning" is a form of ostracism. Members of the Jehovah's community were prohibited,
under threat of their own disfellowship, from having any contact with disfellowshipped persons.
Family members were only allowed to conduct necessary family business with disfellowshipped
members. They were forbidden from talking to them on any other subject. Id. at 876-77.
9. Id. at 877. When Paul approached a childhood friend, the friend told her: "I can't speak to
you. You are disfellowshipped." Other friends told her that the Elders of the congregation in-
structed them not to speak with her. Id.
10. Id. at 876-77. Paul dropped her fraud claim on appeal. Id. at 878 n.1.
11. Id. at 877. The court's jurisdiction was premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). The Jeho-
vah's Witness community to which Paul belonged is located in Ephrata, Washington (the Lower
Valley congregation). Id. At the time of the lawsuit, however, Paul resided in Alaska. Id. at 877.
12. 819 F.2d at 877.
13. Id. The district court held that Paul's affidavits did not set forth facts that would establish
a prima facie case for relief. Moreover, the district court ruled that even if the practice of shunning
was actionable, the court was prohibited from ruling on the issues on the grounds of "ecclesiastical
abstention". Id. Ecclesiastical abstention provides that civil courts may not redetermine the cor-
rectness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision relating to government of a religious
polity. Id. at 878 n.l. The court must accept such decisions as final and binding in their application
to the case at bar. Id. See generally Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich 426 U.S. 696,
710 (1976).
The Ninth Circuit found the abstention doctrine irrelevant because Paul was not alleging that the
new rules governing disassociation were improper under Church doctrine. Nor did she seek relief
for having been wrongfully disfellowshipped. Rather, she sought relief from harm suffered as a
result of conduct ordered by the Church pursuant to Church law. 819 F.2d at 878 n.l.
14. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. 819 F.2d at 883-84.
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nized that while Congress is forbidden from regulating religious belief,16
Congress can prohibit certain religious conduct that poses a danger to
public health, safety, morals, or welfare.17 To determine whether a reli-
gious practice is subject to regulation or insulated under the first amend-
ment, the Supreme Court applies a balancing test.18 For the past twenty-
five years the Supreme Court has struggled to define the elements of that
test. 19
Cantwell v. Connecticut 20 is a precursor to the modem balancing test
cases. In Cantwell, the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut law
prohibiting solicitation of money for religious causes without the Secre-
tary of the Public Welfare Council's approval.21 The Court found the
statute an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion to the
extent that it authorized censorship of religious materials.22 Moreover,
the Court disapproved of the lack of any judicial review over the Secre-
tary's actions.23 The Court held that while the state may regulate the
time, place and manner of solicitation, the state may not prohibit solicita-
tion based solely on religious beliefs.24
16. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto.) 145, 162 (1878). See also Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 402 (1962) ("The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such .... ") (emphasis in original).
17. See, eg., Reynolds, 98 U.S. (8 Otto.) 145 (criminal law prohibiting polygamy, by the Mor-
mon Church, upheld because polygamy was historically viewed as reprehensible by society); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state law prohibiting minors from selling magazines on the
street is not a violation of the free exercise clause even though the sale of magazines by children is
part of the Jehovah's Witnesses' religious beliefs); see also Olsen v. Iowa, 808 F.2d 652 (8th Cir.
1986) (government may charge members of religious group with violations of drug laws even though
the use of drugs is part of the groups' religious practice); United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497 (1st
Cir. 1984). But cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (the truth or falsity of the religious
belief that use of the mail in a fraudulent manner is required may not be challenged).
18. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-94. The balancing test requires weighing the burden on plain-
tiff's religious belief against the state's interest in the regulation. See generally J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1067-88 (3rd ed. 1985).
19. See, eg., Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) [these cases are discussed at infra notes 25-54].
20. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
21. Id. The Secretary had discretion to determine whether the cause was, in fact, a religious
one.
22. Id. This part of the Court's analysis is similar to the first prong of the balancing test-
substantial burden on free exercise-that the Court later developed. See infra notes 37-38 and ac-
companying text.
23. 310 U.S. at 305. The Court was particularly concerned about controlling arbitrary or cor-
rupt practices. Id.
24. Id. This portion of the Court's opinion is the precursor to the second prong of the balanc-
ing test-a compelling state interest. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
The Court also held the charges of breach of the peace brought against the defendants were in
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Braunfeld v. Brown was the Supreme Court's first attempt to define the
elements of the balancing test.25 In Braunfeld, the Court upheld a Penn-
sylvania criminal statute that prohibited the sale of certain enumerated
commodities on Sunday.26 Plaintiffs, Orthodox Jews, challenged the law
on the grounds that it interfered with their free exercise of religion.
The Court recognized the substantial burden placed on Orthodox
Jews, 28 but characterized the burden as indirect.29  If the state enacts a
law to advance legitimate secular goals, the Court held, then the statute
is valid despite its indirect burden on religious conduct, unless the state
may accomplish its purpose by less restrictive means."0 Implicitly,
Braunfeld envisions two steps in the analysis. First, the plaintiff must
show that the law places a substantial burden on the exercise of his reli-
gious beliefs.31 Second, the state must demonstrate an overriding secular
purpose achieved by the least restrictive means.3 2 Applying the test, the
Court found that Pennsylvania had a compelling interest-to set aside a
violation of the free exercise clause. The Court recognized the legitimate state interest in preventing
a riot and punishing those who cause it, but, in this case, the defendants posed no such threat.
Although defendant's literature and records offended listeners or aroused their animosity, the de-
fendants were innocent of any physical assault or personal abuse which would subject them to a
charge of breach of the peace. The Court found these charges a guise to punish and suppress the
defendants' exercise of their religious beliefs. 310 U.S. at 307-11.
25. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
26. Id. at 600, 609.
27. Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute which interfered
with their retail sales business. 366 U.S. at 601. Due to their religious beliefs, plaintiffs closed their
business on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath. However, they did substantial business on Sunday. They
argued that the Sunday closing law would impair their ability to earn a living and render them
unable to continue in business, forfeiting their capital investment. Id. Plaintiffs also argued that the
law gave Saturday workers an unfair advantage. Id. at 602.
28. Id. at 603.
29. Id. at 606. A direct burden is one in which an activity essential to the religious practice is
prohibited (e.g., prohibition on Mormon polygamy). An indirect burden is one, as in Braunfeld, that
makes the practice of religion more difficult, but does not prohibit the practice. See NOWAK, RO-
TUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 18, at 1068.
In Braunfeld, the Court refused to strike down what it perceived to be an indirect burden on
religion, in part, because doing so would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.
366 U.S. at 606. The Court noted that other laws have an indirect economic burden on religious
groups and have been upheld (e.g., a statue limiting the amount a taxpayer may deduct on his tax
return for religious contributions, thereby preventing some donations, or a law closing the courts on
Saturday and Sunday though a. lawyer's religion may require him to rest during the week). Id. at
606.
30. 366 U.S. at 607. Conversely, if the law has as its purpose the obstruction of a religious
practice or discrimination between religions, it is constitutionally invalid. Id.
31. Id. at 605-07.
32. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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single day for "rest, recreation and tranquility"-that outweighed the in-
direct burden on the Orthodox Jewish businessmen.33 Though other ju-
risdictions provided for exemptions from their Sunday closing laws, 34 the
Court refused to fashion an exemption that would frustrate the goals of
the Pennsylvania legislature.
The Supreme Court, in Sherbert v. Verner, expounded further on the
elements of the balancing test. 36 In Sherbert, the Court struck down a
South Carolina statute that denied unemployment benefits to plaintiff, a
member of the Seventh Day Adventists, who refused to work on Satur-
day because of her religious beliefs. 37 The Court first considered whether
the denial of unemployment benefits imposed any burden on plaintiff's
free exercise of religion.38 The Court rejected Braunfeld's direct-indirect
distinction,39 holding that if the burden is substantial, it is irrelevant
whether the burden was an indirect effect of the law.' In application,
the Court found plaintiff pressured to choose between giving up her reli-
gious beliefs or following the Church precepts and foregoing necessary
benefits.41
Second, the Court considered whether any compelling state interest
existed to justify the substantial infringement of plaintiff's first amend-
ment rights.42 South Carolina proffered prevention of fraudulent claims
33. 366 U.S. at 607.
34. See, eg., IND. CODE § 10-4301 (Burns 1956).
35. 366 U.S. at 608. Moreover, the Court refused to reevaluate the wisdom of the statute.
Rather, the Court viewed its job as determining if the law falls within constitutional limits. The
Court believed granting an exemption would make enforcement of the law impossible. Id.
In dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the law required Orthodox Jews to choose between their
religion and business. Id. at 613. Such a burden, though indirect, is substantial. Brennan opined
that Pennsylvania's goal of providing a day of rest deserved less weight than either the goal of
prohibiting polygamy or preventing children from selling magazines on the street. Id. at 614. See
also supra note 17 (discussion of Reynolds and Prince). Furthermore, the state's concern is satisfied
because Orthodox Jews observe their own Sabbath-Sunday. The only purpose Justice Brennan
could find was the mere convenience of having everyone observe the same day of rest. Id. Such a
goal, he believed, failed to outweigh the burden on religion. 366 U.S. at 616.
36. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
37. Id. at 402. Under South Carolina law her failure to accept available work was sufficient
grounds for denial of unemployment benefits. Id. at 399-401.
38. Id. at 403.
39. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
40. 374 U.S. at 404.
41. Id. at 404. The Court saw little difference between this benefit regulation and a fine on
Saturday worship. Id.
42. Id. at 406.
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as a compelling state interest.43 The Court found this justification unsub-
stantiated and insufficient to outweigh the burden on plaintiff's free exer-
cise rights.44 Moreover, South Carolina failed to disprove the existence
of alternative means of regulation that would combat fraud without in-
fringing plaintiff's first amendment rights.4a
The Supreme Court's epilogue to the balancing test came in Wisconsin
v. Yoder.4 In Yoder, the Court held that Wisconsin could not compel
Amish children to enroll in public schools after the eighth grade, a prac-
tice contrary to Amish religious beliefs.47 The Court began by consider-
ing whether the Amish educational practices were religiously based. The
Court stated that conduct based purely on secular, personal, or philo-
sophical grounds would not be protected under the free exercise clause. 48
In this case, however, the Court found the Amish educational practices
43. Id. at 407. The state claimed it had an interest in preventing the filing of fraudulent claims
by unscrupulous workers feigning religious objections to Saturday work. The state feared this prac-
tice would dilute the unemployment compensation fund and hinder the scheduling by employers of
necessary Saturday work. Id. The Court found that the state failed to raise this claim before the
South Carolina Supreme Court. The Court declined to assess the importance of an asserted state
interest without the view of the state court. Even if the state had made this contention at the state
level, however, the Court found no proof to warrant such fears of deceit. Id.
44. 374 U.S. at 409. The Court has reaffirmed Sherbert in two recent decisions. See Thomas v.
Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (a state may not deny unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's
Witness who refused to work in the production of armaments because doing so would be contrary to
his religious beliefs); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987) (same
facts and result as in Sherbert). In Robbie, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, rejected the
test put forth by Chief Justice Burger in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1985). In Roy, the Court
rejected a free exercise challenge to the statutory requirement that a Social Security number be
supplied by any applicant seeking certain welfare benefits. Chief Justice Burger wanted the Court to
adopt a less rigorous test for when a law is neutral and uniform in its application (... the govern-
ment meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits
is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest."). In Robbie, Brennan noted that in
Roy, five Justices had expressly rejected Burger's approach: White, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor
and Brennan himself. Moreover, O'Connor's concurrence in Roy, suggested "[s]uch a test has no
basis in precedent.. ." 476 U.S. at 727.
45. 374 U.S. at 407.
46. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
47. Id. at 207. The Amish believed that sending their children to high school would "inter-
poseD a serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into the Amish religious community."
Id. at 211-12. While high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments,
self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students, Amish society
emphasizes informal learning through doing and a life of "goodness rather than a life of intellect;
wisdom rather than technical knowledge; community welfare rather than competition; and separa-
tion from, rather that integration with, contemporary society." Id. at 210-12.
48. Id. at 215-26.
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central to the beliefs of the Church.4 9
The Court then applied a modified, two-prong balancing test.50 First,
the Court considered whether the evidence supported plaintiffs' claim
that compulsory attendance would be a significant burden on the free
exercise of religion.5 Next, the Court balanced the burden on religion
against the state's asserted interests52 and the degree to which these inter-
ests would be impaired by an Amish exemption.53 The Court found that
the law clearly burdened Amish religious principles and that an Amish
exemption would not significantly impair the state's goals.54
The Supreme Court applied the Yoder balancing test in a federal con-
text in United States v. Lee.55 In Lee, an Amish farmer and carpenter,
who employed several church members, challenged the application of the
49. Id. at 216. The Court stated that if the Amish merely refused to send their children to
school to preserve a "traditional way of life," their free exercise claim would be denied. However,
the Court found that the Amish lifestyle, education practices, and refusal to submit their children to
further secular education were based in religion. Central to this determination were four facts: (1)
non-public education was a shared belief by an organized group rather than a personal preference;
(2) the belief related to certain theocratic principles and interpretation of religious literatures; (3) the
system of beliefs pervaded and regulated their daily lives; and (4) the system of belief and lifestyle
resulting therefrom had been in existence for a substantial period of time. Id. at 216-17.
50. More specifically, the Court stated "[Wisconsin's] interest in universal education ... is not
totally free from a balancing process" and "only those interests of the highest order ... not other-
wise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id. at 214-15.
51. Id. at 215, 219.
52. Wisconsin advanced two arguments in support of compulsory secondary education: prepa-
ration of young citizens for effective political participation and creation of a self-sufficient, self-reliant
group of young people. Id. at 221.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 235-36. The Court found that effective political participation would not be impaired
by a religious exemption. Rather, eight years of formal education, combined with Amish home
training, adequately prepared Amish children for life in a self-limiting environment. Id. at 225-29.
But see Blackwelder v. Safnauer, No. 86-CV-1208, slip op. (N.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988) (refusing to
extend the Yoder analysis across the board to parents who consider it their religious duty to educate
their children in the home, and upholding the New York "substantial equivalence" law against a free
exercise clause attack).
The state also argued that its interest in the children's health and well-being justified an absolute
rule requiring secondary education. The Court recognized that the interest in the child's health
would overcome a claim for religious freedom if the practice was detrimental to the health, training,
or well-being of the child. But because the record showed that the Amish children were well taken
care of and well trained in their community, the state goals would not be impaired by an exemption.
Id. at 233-34. In dissent, Justice Douglas contended that the majority failed to take into account the
issue of the children's right to go beyond the eight grade. Justice Douglas believed that if the chil-
dren were mature enough to say they wished to remain in school, the state may well be able to
override parents' objections. Id. at 243-46.
55. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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Social Security Act to his business on free exercise grounds.5 6 The
Amish believe it is their religious duty to provide for elder church mem-
bers and therefore oppose the social security system. The district court
held the Social Security Act unconstitutional as applied." The Supreme
Court disagreed, noting that "[n]ot all burdens on religion are unconsti-
tutional."58 Though recognizing the burden on the Amish faith, 59 the
Court held that the government's overriding interest in maintaining the
vitality of the social security system required all employers to contrib-
ute.6" Unlike the limited educational exemption in Yoder, here the Court
believed an exemption would prove unmanageable and interfere with ful-
fillment of the government interest.61
Other courts have applied the Yoder balancing test in cases involving
government interference with the free exercise of religion.62 In Bear v.
Reformed Mennonite Church,63 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, faced
with facts analogous to Paul, held that the first amendment does not
grant an absolute privilege against tort liability.64 In Bear, the Mennon-
ite Church excommunicated the plaintiff and instructed members of the
56. Id. at 254-55. Plaintiff filed his suit in response to an Internal Revenue assessment for
unpaid employment taxes in the amount of $27,000. Id.
57. Id. at 255.
58. Id. at 257.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 260. The Court found that widespread voluntary participation would undermine the
Social Security Act. Moreover, a comprehensive social security system allowing voluntary participa-
tion would be a contradiction in terms and difficult, if not impossible, to administer. Id.
61. 455 U.S. at 260. The Court feared that if a taxpayer could avoid paying Social Security
taxes because of religious beliefs, then a taxpayer whose religion opposed war could argue for a
reduction in his income tax representing that portion of his tax money going to war-related activities.
Id.
62. See, e.g., Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1984) (aw requiring a Social Security
number for anyone seeking public benefits held constitutional even though it conflicted with plain-
tiff's belief that Social Security numbers are "the mark of the beast"); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach,
721 F.2d 729 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (governmental interest in a zoning ordinance outweighs the burden on
a religious group that wants to open up a house of worship in an area zoned for single-family dwell-
ings); E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publishing Assoc., 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (government inter-
est in assuring equal employment opportunity under Title VII overrides the burden this interest
places on the free exercise of religion); Backlund v. Board of Commissioners of Kings County Hospi-
tal, 106 Wash.2d 632, 724 P.2d 981 (1986) (hospital regulation requiring doctors to have liability
insurance upheld even though contrary to doctor's religious beliefs).
In all these cases the courts faced a law that was facially neutral (i.e., applicable to everyone
regardless of faith). Despite this fact, the courts continued to apply the Yoder/Sherbert balancing
test rather than Chief Justice Burger's suggested test in Roy. See supra note 44.
63. 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975).
64. Id. at 341, 341 A.2d at 107.
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Church to shun him. Plaintiff sued the Church, alleging that the
Church's "shunning" instruction interfered with his business relations
and caused alienation of affections within his family.6" The trial court
granted the Church's demurrer, holding that the first amendment
granted such religious institutions an absolute privilege against tort lia-
bility. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. 6 The
court found that when the religious practice of the Church would exces-
sively interfere with "paramount state concerns"'67 then states may regu-
late the practices and still comply with the free exercise clause. 8
In Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. ,69 the
Ninth Circuit recognized that shunning by the Jehovah's Witnesses is a
practice pursuant to canon law, which the court is not free to reinter-
pret.70 Under the Washington state71 and United States Constitutions,
church members are entitled to freely exercise their religious beliefs.7 2
The court next considered the issue of state action, and found that state
law, whether statutory or common law (including tort law), constitutes
state action.73
In keeping with free exercise analysis, the court asked whether the im-
position of tort liability would substantially burden the Jehovah's Wit-
65. Id. at 332-33, 341 A.2d at 106.
66. Id. at 335, 341 A.2d at 108.
67. Here, those concerns included "the maintenance of marriage and family relationship, alien-
ation of affection and the tortious interference with a business relation .... Id. at 334, 341 A.2d at
107.
68. Id. The Court held, however, that the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to proceed in his
cause of action against the church. Id. at 335, 341 A.2d at 108.
69. 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987).
70. Id. at 878.
71. WASH. CONST. Art. I, § 11, amend. 34 states, in part:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship,
shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person
or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
and safety of the state.
72. 819 F.2d at 879. The court considered at length whether the Washington Constitution or
United States Constitution applied. The court concluded that the issue was irrelevant because the
provisions are identical in scope. The court did not have to decide the issue, however, because the
Supreme Court previously decided that the first amendment applies to the states. Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (discussed at supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text). This
constitutional conflicts question is only important if the state constitution is more generous in grant-
ing free exercise rights than is the United States Constitution. 819 F.2d at 880 n.3.
73. Id. at 880 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)) ("The test is
not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has
in fact been exercised.").
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nesses' free exercise rights.74 Following the Braunfeld, Sherbert, and
Yoder line of analysis, 75 the court found that imposing tort rules on the
Church would result in a direct burden on religion.76 Furthermore, the
court found the burden to be substantial because tort liability puts great
pressure on a defendant either to forego a part of its religious faith or be
sued for exercising a constitutional right."
The court also considered the second part of the balancing test: the
compelling state interest in tort regulation.78 First, the court found that
shunning did not pose a sufficient threat to public health, safety, or mo-
rality to warrant state intervention.79 Second, the court reasoned that if
the tort resulted in intangible or emotional harm,8" in most circum-
stances a cause of action will not lie against the Church.8 t The court
opined that if the first amendment is to have any meaning, society must
tolerate offenses to its sensibilities.8 2
Finally, the court concluded that granting the privilege in this case was
appropriate because Paul was a past member of the Church. 3 The court
reasoned that churches are generally afforded great latitude in disciplin-
ing past and present members; therefore, the court's role is somewhat
limited.8
4
The Ninth Circuit's extension of the free exercise clause to include a
74. Id.
75. Id. at 881. See also supra notes 25-54 and accompanying text. The court noted that the
Braunfeld rationale was substantially undermined in Sherbert, Yoder, and Hobble. Even ifBraunfeld
were still good law, the court in Paul refused to give it controlling effect. Id. at 881 n.4.
76. Id. at 880.
77. 819 F.2d at 881.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is characterized by a tortfeasor's extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly inflicted. The presence of physical harm is not re-
quired for recovery. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46 (1976). The court's language
suggests that its holding might not apply to more tangible harms. See infra note 84.
81. 819 F.2d at 883. The court noted that the values underlying the free exercise clause have
been zealously protected, even at the expense of other interests. Id.
82. Id. at 883.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court restricted its holding to intangible torts. The court intimated that the
Church would be liable had it committed a tangible tort. In addition, the court did not say Paul's
injuries were unreal or insubstantial because recognition of the privilege prevented it from reaching
the question. The court's distinction between members and non-members injured by the Church,
and the possible significance of granting tort immunity, is discussed in Note, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be Free Exercise?, 84 MicH. L.
REv. 1296 (May 1986).
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privilege against tort liability is incorrect. First, by distinguishing emo-
tional harms from physical harms, the court downplayed the significance
of an emotional injury, which is often times as great as physical harm."
Ordinarily, plaintiffs may recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress without any concomitant physical injury.86 When the injury is
nonphysical, whether the defendant is a church should not matter.
Second, the Ninth Circuit's application of the balancing test failed to
fully consider the state's compelling interest.87 As the court in Bear
held, 88 the state has an interest in family and business tranquility which
may override the unfettered exercise of religious freedom.89 The Ninth
Circuit logically could have extended this "paramount state interest" ra-
tionale to include a citizen's interest in emotional well-being. At a mini-
mum, the court could have recognized that, as in Bear, the plaintiff
pleaded a case sufficient to get to a jury to try to prove the elements
required for relief.90
Finally, in most of the free exercise cases decided by the Supreme
Court the government has acted against the religious group, either by
imposing criminal sanctions for religious conduct or denying members
some benefit because of their religious beliefs.91 In Paul, however, the
religious group acted as the aggressor, violating the plaintiff's right to
emotional well-being. By granting defendants an absolute privilege
against tort liability, the court has allowed the Church to use the shield
of the first amendment as a sword.92
The Paul decision is an unfortunate expansion of a doctrine intended
to protect individual rights. To turn the doctrine on its head and use it
as a means to thwart another person's rights is an ironic twist that would
undoubtedly displease the drafters of the first amendment. One can hope
85. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 12 at 54-66.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment k (1976).
87. See supra notes 71, 77-82 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
90. See Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 334, 341 A.2d 105, 107 (1975).
91. See supra notes 25-54 and accompanying text.
92. In addition, it surely is relevant that "shunning is a means of helping the Church at the
expense of ex-members, who may plausibly argue that they are in no way helped or reformed by the
process." See Note, supra note 84, at 1321 n.103. Finally, the court found that the Church should
be given leeway in punishing ex-members. The court's reasons for this belief are unclear. Unlike
persons who are members of the Church, ex-members have, by leaving, shown a desire to be free
from control by the religious hierarchy. To say that they will be controlled indefinitely by a hierar-
chy they no longer recognize seems a cruel punishment.
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that other jurisdictions will follow the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's de-
cision in Bear. In addition, it seems unlikely Paul will be extended to a
church's intentional physical tort against an ex-member.93 At best, Paul
can be viewed as a slight detour from the correct interpretation of the
free exercise clause and the proper balancing of interests performed by
the Supreme Court and numerous lower courts.
S.P.
93. See supra note 80.
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